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Figure 1: Japan, 2011. Motorists make U-turns and drive away upon encountering a tsunami wave.
(A TV screen capture at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=coPW6unxeY8.)
ABSTRACT
When developing autonomous systems, engineers and other stake-
holders make great efforts to prepare the system for all foreseeable
events and conditions. However, such systems are still bound to
encounter situations that were not considered at design time. For
reasons like safety, cost, or ethics it is often highly desired that
these new cases be handled correctly upon first encounter. In this
paper, we first justify our position that there will always exist un-
predicted events and conditions, driven by, e.g., new inventions in
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the real world, the diversity of world-wide system deployments and
uses, and the possibility that multiple events that were overseen at
design time will not only occur, but will occur together. We then
argue that despite the unpredictability, handling such situations is
indeed possible. Hence, we offer and exemplify design principles,
which, when applied in advance, will enable systems to deal with
unpredicted circumstances. We conclude with a discussion of how
this work and a much-needed thorough study of the unexpected
can contribute toward a foundation of engineering principles for
developing trustworthy next-generation autonomous systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Can the engineer of an autonomous system, such as a self-driving
car or an in-hospital delivery-assistant robot, predict all conditions
and events that it may encounter?
Clearly the answer is negative, and there are many reasons:
(1) The system will encounter new objects and systems that might
be invented and created only after the system at hand is built and
deployed, and the users or owners of the deployed system may
not apply relevant updates, if any are available at all. (2) For rea-
sons of cost and time, developers sometimes choose to not consider
certain less likely events, relying on other mitigating factors (like
natural help from nearby humans) to handle them. (3) Successful au-
tonomous systems will be distributed world-wide, and at least some
of them are likely to be deployed in environments with which the
developers were not familiar and did not consider. (4) Autonomous
systems will often operate in rich environments characterized by
many variables and actors (both humans and systems); even the
most sophisticated testing and verification tools we have cannot an-
alyze the exponentially-many combinations of actions and variable
values, both intended and unintended. (5) Any system is likely to be
the target of malicious attacks — physical or cyber in nature — by
criminals, hackers and foreign bodies; such attacks are likely to seek
vulnerabilities in the systems, which by definition are those aspects
that the developers did not prepare for and were not expecting.
Thus, we may ask: is it realistic to expect autonomous systems
of the future to be able to handle such unexpected events? After
all, they were unexpected! Here, we claim, the answer is positive.
This makes some sense, since humans do it all the time, sometimes
successfully and sometimes less so (malicious attacks are a special
case). Humans are even required to react in certain ways: when an
unexpected event occurs a human’s reaction is often brought up in
a court of law, because, say, someone was hurt, and the judge will
consider what a reasonable person would have done in such a case.
We believe that systems, like humans, are also required to react
properly upon their first encounter with an unexpected situation.
Once next-generation autonomous systems are deployed, the world
will not be able to restrict or constrain innovation, nor stop the
occurrence of unusual combinations of events. Such systems will
have to be updated in an ongoing manner with instructions for
dealing correctly with these new situations. The risks involved may
well outweigh what society will be able to handle with appropriate
insurance, by imposing regulations on people’s behavior, or by
simply accepting certain pains or costs in return for the benefits a
new system.
Thus, while the developers must always study the system and
its target environments extensively in preparation for the future,
there remains the question of how to equip a system to deal with
its unexpected encounters. In [6], Harel, Marron and Sifakis argue
that a new foundation is needed for engineering next generation
autonomous systems, which they term Autonomics. The problem
of dealing with unpredicted—or even unpredictable—events and
conditions, is a central part of the problem.
In Sections 2,3, 4 and 5, we propose several engineering practices
that can help the successful handling of always-impending occur-
rences of unexpected events and conditions. These are organized in
groups: reactive high level behaviors, knowledge that the system
must have at its disposal, and considerations emanating from the
system’s being part of a larger ecosystem of humans and machines.
This preliminary list was compiled from discussions with scientists
and professionals, and reviewed and augmented following an educa-
tional workshop for students at the Weizmann Institute of Science.
We expect that the list will be extended as part of the systematic
construction of the Autonomics engineering foundation.
Then, in Section 6, we propose that the topic of dealing with the
unexpected deserves a broader and deeper theoretical underpinning
in order to become part of a practical engineering foundation, and
we review related research that can support such an endeavor.
2 REACTIVE AND PROACTIVE BEHAVIORS
AND SKILLS
2.1 Specifying High-level Behavioral Reaction
Throughout life we observe many behavioral patterns. For example,
much has been written about Fight or Flight in nature as generic
solutions for handling the environment with limited capabilities
for sensing, physical acting, and cognitive processing. In the world
of science fiction, Asimov suggested generic laws to govern all
robotic behavior, related to not injuring others, obedience, and self-
preservation. Certain social norms and etiquette, as well as business
rules, form another facet of practical, yet high level, programming of
behavior. We propose that one can even today build into the system
concrete behavioral rules that use abstract concepts, like “When
sensing danger, get away”, “when under attack, find shelter”, “when
you cannot understand what is happening, slow down”. Separate
definitions can classify sensory data indicators as ‘danger’ ‘attack’
or ‘not understood’, and assign various actuator capabilities for
implementing the reactions of ‘getting away’, ‘finding shelter’, or
‘slowing down’. For example, for an autonomous vehicle (AV) on a
highway, slowing down may mean reducing speed, whereas for a
robot or a delivery vehicle on a factory floor or plant yard (FFAV)
‘slowing down’ may be implemented as an immediate stop. For
getting away from danger on a city street, an AV could make a U-
turn, whereas an FFAV may simply switch into reverse gear. Rules
like these were probably in the backs of the minds of first-line
drivers in Figure 1, who saw the tsunami wave and immediately
turned back.
As part of such concrete, yet high-level behaviors, the system
may have not only goals and constraints, which are common con-
cepts in system design, but also responsibilities. For example, an
autonomous taxi has goals (e.g., to transport passengers between
two points), and requirements (e.g., to comply with traffic and safety
rules). However, if we also program into the system the more gen-
eral responsibility for passenger safety, additional behaviors may
emerge when unexpected events occur. We might want such a new
behavior to mimic what happens when a person drives a friend in a
foreign city and somemajor failure or traffic jam occurs; namely, the
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driver is expected to help the passenger find an alternative means
of transportation, and not merely abort the goal and abandon them.
2.2 Probing
When encountering an unfamiliar situation, a system can actively
explore what it means. For example, assume that an FFAV’s narrow
route in the plant yard is blocked by a large unknown object. The
FFAV should be able to figure out if the object is just an empty
cardboard box or plastic bag blown over by the wind. Standard cam-
eras and basic actuators, like a robotic arm, combined with internet
image lookup should be enough for detecting this fact, maybe ac-
companied by slight prodding of the object by the FFAV body. The
robot can then decide whether to push the box or bag aside, pass
around it, or call for help. An important design implication here
is that for probing certain unexpected objects and situations the
system may need to be equipped in advance with additional sensors
and actuators, or have dynamic access to other such facilities (like
security cameras or other robots), beyond the minimum required
for completing its missions in typical environments.
2.3 [Self-]Reflection
The system should be able to “look” at itself and recognize its own
state and history, using this information in its decision making.
Unlike a poor fly repeatedly attempting to escape through a glass
window, an autonomous system should be able to notice that it
has been in the current state before, or that a certain action did
not yield the desired results, and apply appropriate actions. For
example, from the movie [11] it appears that the MIT robot in the
DARPA competition of 2015 begins to shake, loses its balance and
falls when it tries to step out of a still-moving vehicle. In addition
to standard events indicating arrival at the destination and that it
is time to step out of the car, it is possible that having the robot
sense that it is still moving forward, or sensing that it is beginning
to shake, could be used to prevent the actual damaging fall.
The reflection can extend far into the past. Given a current situ-
ation, the system can examine historical event logs to determine
which actions yielded desired results in similar situations.
To enrich state awareness, designers can pre-specify finer levels
or order of desirability among states. The system can then apply
these in its planning decisions; see e.g., the discussion of soft goals
in [1].
Reflection applies also to broader context. For example, An au-
tonomous system may need to be aware that it should be quiet, say,
late at night, or when someone is having an important conversation,
and consequently change its action plans. Or, an AV trained to drive
on the right, may realize that it is in country where driving is on
the left, and determine that it should stop completely and/or turn
over control to someone else.
An important form of reflection is understanding causality re-
lationship between system actions and expected and unexpected
results. This can help in handling such unexpected situations -
which may stem either from (errors in) system decisions or from
environmental changes.
2.4 Physical and Logical Look-Ahead
The farther the system can look ahead in space and in time, the
less unexpected the future will turn out to be. A high-mounted 360-
degree camera can provide a better view for an AV than the standard
driver view. Access to plant security cameras can provide an FFAV
with an up-to-date real-time map of all stationary and moving
objects relevant to its path and mission. Run-time simulation can
provide predictions, e.g., whether the stationary car that just turned
on its lights will start moving, or whether the system’s battery has
enough charge to complete the current mission.
2.5 Preparing and Pursuing Alternative
Solutions
Autonomous systems should be designed with several alternative
solutions for completing their tasks, in addition to component re-
dundancy and extra capacity that can compensate for failure or
performance constraints.
Relating to the example of a taxi system and a foreign passenger
(in Section 2.1), the system should not only be able to find alternative
routes when it encounters traffic jams and blocked roads. Should
the system realize that it cannot complete its mission, it should be
able to automatically transfer the passenger into another mode of
transportation—such as taking them to a train station or calling
another taxi on their behalf.
3 KNOWLEDGE AND SKILL ACQUISITION
3.1 Knowledge of the system’s own capabilities
The availability of the system’s sensors and actuators should be
“known” generally, and be accessible to multiple components rather
then be invoked only bymission-specific code. In this way, scenarios
for, e.g., providing camera views to other programmed functions
or to a human assistant, or operating the motors upon demand
to handle unexpected conditions, could emerge from automated
planning when facing new conditions. Agent design concepts such
as Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) [5] can help implement such ap-
proaches. Such knowledge can also be useful when the autonomous
system is called upon to help other systems, carrying out functions
beyond its original ones.
Knowing the system’s own capabilities involves also confirming
their existence and proper operations. If a component has already
failed, it is better to proactively discover it in advance, rather than
wait until the capability is needed.
3.2 Access to General World Knowledge
For carrying out many of the unexpected functions, the systemmust
have common knowledge about the world, and “laws of nature” in
the environment in which it operates: from a physics engine that
understands gravity, speed, friction and impact , to predicting object
behavior (e.g., stationary boxes on the floor don’t start moving on
their own; people, on the other hand do; the speed of a human
walking is at most X, and the speed of an electric scooter can
reach Y in a few seconds). This knowledge can be made local to
the autonomous system, or made accessible from other systems or
servers.
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3.3 Automated Run-time Knowledge
Acquisition
Systems can obtain valuable information in real time. One can only
wonder if any of the drivers turning back in Figure 1 did so not
because of what they saw, but because they just heard a tsunami
warning siren or announcement. Collecting weather and road con-
dition information, AVs can thus ‘predict’ that their planned route
will be impassable due to a snowstorm forecast, and an FFAV check-
ing the locations of humans in a plant may discover that there is
no person to receive the current delivery, and perhaps resched-
ule the entire trip. This aspect is, of course, closely related to the
look-ahead discussed in Section 2.4.
3.4 Learning and Adaptivity
Having systems learn from their own successes and failures and
other aspects of experience is a key theme in modern engineering
and is crucial also to handling unexpected events. We propose that
learning and adaptivity can be applied in a broader way. For exam-
ple, if an AV or a system of AVs also learns and shares knowledge
about the behavior of the objects they see in their environment,
such as strange agricultural machinery in a field, it is possible that
an AV would handle better the very first situation in which they
encounter such an object.
4 VIEWING THE SYSTEM AS A SOCIAL
ENTITY
Humans often deal with unexpected circumstances by relying on
various forms of interactions with others. In this section, we discuss
design considerations and proactive work of the system, which
mimic such social reliance and collaboration, potentially reducing
unexpected circumstances and facilitating handling them when
they do occur.
4.1 Delineating the System’s Scope of
Responsibility
“NoMan is an Island”, says John Donne. The same holds for systems,
especially autonomous ones. Relating to the earlier discussion on
responsibilities, it is important to articulate roles and responsibili-
ties. Who is responsible for getting an executive from an airport
in a foreign city to an important meeting in town, safely and on
time? The autonomous taxi itself? The taxi company? The exec-
utive himself or herself? The company for which the executive
works and has arranged the trip? Moreover, if there is a problem
with the AV and alternatives are sought, whose responsibility is it to
provide another vehicle, to arrange for another mode of transport,
to decide to send someone else to the meeting, or to arrange for a
teleconference instead? Determining these roles in advance can be
very useful in handling the unexpected.
Given some ‘responsibility space’ in a problem domain (see dis-
cussion of ontologies in Section 6) one may even consider formal-
verification approaches to help close any gaps in assignment of
responsibilities and roles.
4.2 Mimicking Others
Some of drivers in Figure 1 probably did not see the tsunami wave
themselves and did not hear about it on the radio, but reacted to
the other drivers’ sudden reversal and flight. Systems should be
able to apply such mimicking too, when appropriate. For example,
if an AV proceeding along a two-lane road notices that it own lane
is completely empty but that the other one consists of a long line
of queued cars, it should probably mimic the queued cars and ease
into their lane, "realizing" that the empty lane is blocked and should
not be used.
4.3 Asking for Help and Support
Prompting a human for aid at important decision points or in car-
rying out tasks that the system cannot do itself, is a standard and
common practice in system design, so it is only natural that au-
tonomous systems facing unexpected circumstances should do the
same. However, this latter context requires special attention and
perhaps different design. Examples of question that have to be
addressed are: Who should be contacted when such a situation
requires outside help, a human or another machine? Should the
contacted agent (human or machine) be in a remote central con-
trol function or physically close to the system? What skills and
capabilities must the helping agent have? What information should
the autonomous system communicate to the selected helper? What
interfaces are needed in the autonomous system to enable such
help? (Having the system apply its own capabilities to help others
is discussed in Sections 3.1 and 4.6.)
4.4 Enabling Passive Acceptance of Help
An autonomous systemmay not always be aware that it is in need of
help, but should nevertheless facilitate it. A passerby should be able
to communicate to an AV that there is some alarming danger ahead;
a control center should be able to take over and override systems
decisions—either forcing certain behaviors or a complete standstill;
or if the system is stuck in a place with no outside communication
it should be able to communicate (through computer display or
local data communications, or just a fixed printed sticker) enough
information about its identity (and possibly its current state), so
that other agents can act at their own initiative, or transmit the
information onward to the owners of the system from another
location.
4.5 Communicating Overall Plans and Present
Intentions
Turn signals and brake lights are simple facilities that indicate a
driver’s intention and thereby help prevent accidents and reduce
stress. Communication, coordination and negotiations are already a
common design aspect in multi-agent systems [5, 7]. Autonomous
systems can communicate their intentions muchmore broadly, with
great effect. For example, an AV can communicate its planned route,
thus helping navigation systems predict road congestion; it can
also indicate from far away when it plans to stop at a crosswalk,
allowing pedestrians to move forward sooner. An industrial robot
can communicate its intended next steps, allowing humans to work
more safely closer to it.
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4.6 Recording and Sharing Static and Dynamic
Knowledge
Trust in the system, and/or in the organization controlling it, can be
dramatically enhanced by providing information that contributes to
the mitigation and handling of unexpected conditions. One aspect
is sharing static information about how the system is built and
how it is programmed to behave. Another is collecting and sharing
dynamic information both about the system’s own behavior and
about its environment. The latter can be passive — as in sharing
security camera recordings — or proactive, reporting current condi-
tions, changes relative to known maps, hazards, or even reporting
humans and other devices that it has encountered and who may
need help.
4.7 Negotiations
Often dealing with the unexpected is difficult because of constraints
and specific instructions imposed at design time. However, in real
life many constraints are bendable. Human drivers often communi-
cate with others in order to resolve issues like being in the wrong
lane; people standing in a queue can negotiate to allow one who is
in a hurry to proceed; and many people in a room can find ways to
have everyone feel comfortable with the temperature, combining
opening or closing of windows, settings of the A/C, wearing jackets,
and/or rearranging the seating. When encountering unexpected
events and conditions, an autonomous system should be able to
participate in such negotiations with the entities in its environment,
by communicating its desires, what it can and cannot change, un-
derstanding the (changing) needs of others, and adjusting its goals
and plans. Here again, BDI concepts [5] may prove instrumental.
5 PROACTIVE EXPLORATION OF THE
EXPECTED
Complementing the sections on how to deal with the inevitable oc-
currence of unexpected circumstances, we briefly review techniques
which one can use in exploring the problem domain in anticipation
of possible situations, towards making explicit, ordinary prepara-
tions: (1) straightforward studies of the system and its environment
using documents, existing systems, brainstorming with colleagues
and domain experts, etc.; (2) considering the system’s operation in
related but more challenging environments, e.g., for an AV, instead
of an intended modern quiet suburban neighborhood, consider it
operating in a busy narrow alley of a medieval town packed with
tourists; or, for an FFAV, instead of the originally targeted hospi-
tal environment, consider it operating on a factory floor or plant
yard; then, reapply relevant new aspects of the more demanding
conditions back to the original environment; (3) challenging de-
velopers and colleagues to create failure situations for the system;
(4) studying famous failures in similar systems and environments;
(5) building models of the environment and the system, running
simulations, and then examining simulation runs for emergent
properties that can suggest vulnerabilities; (6) noting in the above
rather standard simulations aspects that appear too synthetic or
oversimplified and ‘digging deeper’ in those; e.g., if an AV simula-
tion exhibits a very low variability in pedestrian behavior, one can
think of what the system should do if it encounters a performing
street juggler, or a drunk brawl outside a bar, and do this analysis
regardless of whether the current simulator can recreate these con-
ditions or not; (6) mentally simulating the drafting of a classical
legal contract with regards to the system’s behavior, focusing on
using certain terms in advance which can cover broad situations
when unexpected situations occur.
6 TOWARD A “SCIENCE OF THE
UNEXPECTED”
We believe that preparing systems to deal with the unexpected
should be one of the topics covered by the Autonomics engineering
foundation discussed in [6]. Going beyond the specific ideas listed
in the preceding sections, the foundation should cover the topic ac-
companied by systematic engineering methodologies for all phases
of development, by reusable specification libraries, domain-specific
ontologies, simulation, testing and verification tools, and more.
In addition, we believe that there will be a need for a scientifically
rigorous apparatus for the domain. This should facilitate detailed
and broad study of the unexpected, ensure fresh examination and
evolution of the solutions, as systems and the real world evolve,
and enable critical assessment of the quality (e.g., completeness,
non-ambiguity) of all associated practices and artifacts.
To evolve such theoretical instrumentation, various perspective
approaches may be adopted. Below we briefly discuss two, and
acknowledge that there is still much more to be investigated.
One possible perspective is to incorporate concepts from digital
twin approaches [4], or more fundamentally, to use a representa-
tional model as part of the deep-structure view of an Information
System (IS), as proposed by Wand and Weber [13]. According to
this view, an IS is seen as a digital means for representing some
domain or some part of the real-world. For example, a camera
complemented by automatic object detection algorithm and data
persistence should faithfully represent the elements anticipated
to exist in the real-world environment in which the system is de-
ployed.
This view has also given rise to the adoption of various onto-
logical theories, such as the one by Bunge [2], for determining the
capacity of any IS to faithfully represent its real-world environment.
This way, an ontological taxonomy can determine, for example, the
validity of any object instantiated in a system, i.e., whether it has
meaning or semantics within the domain, regardless of its concrete
classification in the IS. Instead, each such object can belong to a
corresponding ontological concept such as a thing or an event in
the real world. This approach can assist in formal definitions of the
unexpected, such as this:
Definition 6.1. We say that an object, an event-occurrence or a
system state which is associated with a particular concept in a given
ontology is unexpected in the context of a given system, if either (a)
the ontological concept (i.e., class) does not have a representation in
the system, or (b) the system cannot effectively associate the object,
state, or event-occurrence with the (existing) system representation
of the ontological concept, dynamically, at run time.
According to the ontological view and the above definition, we
can now also conclude that any IS, being an artifact, is always
susceptible to ontological deficit, where it may create or encounter
objects that lack a corresponding interpretation in the system. Rec-
ognizing this deficit in real time and perhaps transferring the object
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for handling by humans or by another system can be part of a
design for dealing with the unexpected.
Different systems may also differ in the way they implement the
classification mechanism. For example, the work by Parsons and
Wand [9] has criticized the assumption of inherent classification,
under which an object can only be recorded if it is a member of a cer-
tain class. The same implementation also mandates the specification
of each class via the collection of its objects (i.e., classification-by-
containment). An example of a mechanism that conforms to this
approach is the traditional relational database model and the un-
derlying operations thereof [3]. In object oriented programming,
multiple inheritance and interfaces address some of these issues,
but the basic classification remains.
A system that does not conform to the assumption of inherent
classification enables the recording of objects independent of their
class membership(s). Furthermore, in [9], the authors suggest one
such alternative, in which a classification-by-property approach
is employed. This approach entails articulation of objects and of
classes independently of each other, and specifying classes and ob-
jects via their properties. For example the class(dangerous-species)
may be defined as any living entity that possesses any one of the
properties {eye-size = big, teeth-size = big, crawling-ability = true}.
Similarly the object(snake1) may be defined as an entity that pos-
sesses the properties {location = location1, crawling-ability = true}.
Decoupling specifications of classes and objects is essential for
dealing with the existence of the unknown, that is, objects in the
domain that have no meaning in the system. The importance of a
specification as given in the above example is not only in allowing
the ad-hoc determination of snake1 as being an instance of the class
dangerous-species. It is also in allowing an independent representa-
tion of an object like snake1, regardless of whether or not we know
its class. An unexpected object produced in or encountered by a
system that conforms to the assumption of inherent classification
is at risk of being either incorrectly classified or altogether dropped.
Both may lead to undesired outcomes.
Another perspective is a socio-technical one, where a human
encounters unexpected events or conditions and a system augments
the person’s capabilities in dealing with the situation [8], while
mitigating biases. For example, a security officer in a large store
may be monitoring the store via multiple screens. According to
the representativeness heuristic introduced by [12], the officer, as a
human being, may focus on certain kinds of people, based, say, on
appearance, as opposed to focusing on actual behavior.
Finally, research in neurology, psychology, philosophy, discusses
at length many issues of reconciling reality, perception and expec-
tations (see, e.g., [10] and references therein). Advancing insights
about the human mind may well feed into our engineering goals.
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